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Abstract 
 
A key issue for ecological economics concerns the processes whereby people engage in 
ecologically responsible behavior and contribute to environmental quality even when they 
involve a personal cost for a shared benefit. 
 
This paper explores the relative impact of intrinsic motivation versus external conditions 
and economic incentives on eight pro-environmental behaviors (PEBs). Previous research 
has mostly focused on one of these two aspects or studied whether external incentives can 
crowd out moral motivation. More comprehensive accounts of the interplay of these factors 
are rare and mostly dated or report small-scale experiments and case studies.  
 
Using a data set measuring PEBs and environmental attitudes in the European Union’s 28 
member states, this paper tests both sets of variables on a wider scale. It assesses the 
importance of intrinsic motivation as a dominant factor and shows how differing levels of 
intrinsic motivation influence the effectiveness of external conditions, such as monetary 
incentives and green infrastructures. External incentives are found to interact positively 
with intrinsic motivation. The findings also suggest that the influence of external factors 
varies depending on whether the behavior examined is cost neutral or implies costs or 
rewards.  
 
We further show that other non-strictly-related factors can affect the salience of an 
environmental norm and consequently the adoption of the corresponding behavior. 
Pressing economic preoccupations can distract individuals from behaving pro-
environmentally, and PEBs are more likely to arise in individuals who care about the future. 
 
The results suggest that two-pronged policies, which take into account intrinsic motivation 
and external conditions, are needed to reach a high observance rate in the population in the 
short and in the long term. The wider significance of these results for environmental policy 
and policy guidance for each of the eight PEBs is discussed.  
                                                        
*  We thank Lidia Andrés Delgado, Michael Brody, Daniel J. Fiorino, Joe Greenblott, Josep 
Lluis Raymond and Claudia Schneider for helpful comments and inspiring conversations. We 
gratefully acknowledge funding from “Economics and Climate Change: determinants, inequalities and 
mitigation” ECO2015-67524-R, a research project funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economics and 
Competitiveness. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The transition towards an ecologically sustainable economy implies a radical 
transformation of people’s lifestyles. Consumers’ desires drive the demand that is 
exhausting natural resources and generating unsustainable levels of waste (Jackson, 
2005).  
 
It has been estimated that, to maintain global warming below the 2 °C threshold, 
technological advances will play a minor role, while the majority of the mitigation 
effort should come from behavior change (van den Bergh, 2013). Thus, individual 
behavior is not just a relevant driver of emissions but also a “potential agent for 
change in emissions” (IPCC, 2014, p. 388). 
 
Understanding the determinants of pro-environmental behavior (PEB) is the key to 
designing policies that can promote more sustainable lifestyles.  
 
Like human behavior in general, PEB is jointly determined by cognitive processes 
that are internal to the individual and by the external context that surrounds her. In 
the past most studies, and consequently policy recommendations, have typically 
focused on one of these two aspects, favoring either educational interventions or 
alterations of external conditions through incentives or taxes (Fehr & Gintis, 2007; 
Guagnano, Stern, & Dietz, 1995; Turaga, Howarth, & Borsuk, 2010). However, these 
one-pronged approaches ignore the insights from the other perspective, any 
conditional effect that the variables in one approach may have on variables of the 
other, as well as the interactions between them (Guagnano et al., 1995).  
 
This paper proposes an integrated framework to address these shortcomings in 
support of two-pronged policies. It contributes to the understanding of the 
conditions under which internal factors are conducive of PEB and when providing 
external incentives—such as the provision of monetary incentives and green 
infrastructures—can be effective. 
 
The framework proposed here adopts a holistic approach, extending beyond 
directly related factors, such as attitudes towards the environment or incentives to 
behave pro-environmentally (PE). Studies have suggested that the activation of a 
norm into behavior also depends on the salience of such a norm in a particular 
situation (Cialdini et al., 2006). An individual’s ability to focus on environmental 
norms could for example be affected negatively by other more pressing 
preoccupations, such as financial constraints. Additionally, since PEB implies a cost 
today for increased environmental quality tomorrow, future environmental quality 
might be more salient to individuals who do not discount future outcomes too much. 
Thus, it is expected that more future-oriented individuals should behave more PE. 
Both possibilities are explored and tested in this paper.  
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1.1 Objectives 
 
Using a survey data set of self-reported PEBs and environmental attitudes for 
28,000 respondents in the European Union’s 28 member states, this study analyzes 
the drivers of eight different PEBs.  
 
The paper aims: 
 
1 To assess the relative strength of intrinsic motivation versus external 
conditions and to determine whether it varies depending on the PEB observed.  
2 To determine whether seemingly unrelated factors, such as an individual’s 
financial constraints and limited future orientedness, can negatively affect PEB, 
that is by lowering the perceived salience of an environmental norm. 
3 To assess whether differing levels of intrinsic motivation influence the 
effectiveness of external conditions, such as incentives, financial problems and 
green infrastructures.  
 
The present study represents the first empirical test in which the interaction of 
intrinsic and external factors is considered across a wide set of countries and 
behaviors. Previous research has either been limited to case studies and field 
experiments (De Young, 1985; Derksen & Gartrell, 1993; Guagnano et al., 1995; 
Humphrey, Bord, Hammond, & Mann, 1977; Katzev & Pardini, 1987)—restricting 
the potential applicability of the findings to the particular socio-cultural context 
involved—or focused on just one aspect of the relationship between these two 
groups of variables (Cecere, Mancinelli, & Mazzanti, 2014; Ferrara & Missios, 
2012)—analyzing whether external incentives crowd out the moral motivation to 
sort waste. 
 
Extending the analysis to several countries offers two kinds of advantages: it 
highlights national differences, and the reasons behind them, as well as allowing us 
to determine near “universal” relationships and generalizable lessons. In addition, 
linking attitudes towards the future and a person’s financial preoccupations with 
PEB is a novel approach in the literature.  
1.2 Background 
 
Traditionally, PEB has been studied either as: i) the outcome of an internal process 
of moral deliberation in which the individual supposedly acts in complete autonomy 
from her external context (Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Black, Stern, & Elworth, 1985; 
Grodzińska-Jurczak, 2003; Heberlein, 1981; Hopper & Nielsen, 1991; Sidique, Joshi, 
& Lupi, 2010); or as ii) the consequence of an external stimulus to which the 
individual responds as an automaton regardless of her own convictions (Ferrara & 
Missios, 2005; Jacobs & Bailey, 1983; Linderhof, Kooreman, Allers, & Wiersma, 
2001; Palmer & Walls, 1997) (as cited in Guagnano et al., 1995). While both 
approaches have demonstrated some validity, later evidence that human behavior is 
determined by both internal and external factors and their interaction has 
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supported the development of integrated frameworks (Jackson, 2005; Kirakozian, 
2016; Turaga et al., 2010; van den Bergh, 2008).  
 
In terms of policy effectiveness, an integrated framework of intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation is relevant for three main reasons:  
i) Different kinds of individuals are likely to respond to different kinds 
of incentives.  
ii) External incentives may produce quick results that, however, do not 
extend beyond the duration of the incentive itself, while promoting 
internal motivation may produce effects in a longer time frame but 
that may also last longer. Thus, both kinds of stimuli might be needed 
to achieve both short- and long-term results. 
iii) One type of stimulus may work conditionally on the other. For 
example, external incentives may be ineffective if not supported by a 
basic level of intrinsic motivation, but strong intrinsic motivation may 
also be ineffective on its own with a complete lack of green 
infrastructures. Glaeser (2014) highlights how the interaction 
between environmentalist campaigns and classic policy interventions 
can lead to unforeseen effects, thereby reinforcing the need for an 
integrated approach to monitor and  offset possible unwanted 
consequences. 
 
Thus, to reach out to a wider public, into a longer time frame and more effectively, 
the two kinds of motivations and how they interact with each other need to be 
understood and enforced.   
 
The “attitude–behavior context” (ABC) model—initially posited by Guagnano et al. 
(1995)—represents one of the earliest and most complete attempts to create a 
model in which behavior and policy effectiveness do not depend on the level of 
either intrinsic motivation (referred to by the authors as attitudes) or external 
conditions by themselves but on their relative value to each other. They proposed 
that PEB can take place when both the intrinsic and the external conditions are 
positive or when at least one of the two is positive enough to offset the low value of 
the other. They also suggested that, if the external conditions are extremely 
unfavorable to PEB or extremely favorable, intrinsic motivation will not affect 
behavior. For example, an educational program to improve environmental 
awareness will not have an impact on the population’s littering behavior in a context 
in which there are no trash bins or, on the contrary, if there are already bins 
everywhere and heavy fines for not using them. Similarly, Derksen and Gartrell 
(1993) found that intrinsic motivation can enhance recycling rates but cannot 
overcome the barriers represented by a lack of infrastructures alone.   
 
Another way to think about PEB is as a contrast between individual and social 
rationality, as it typically involves a personal cost for increased environmental 
quality, which is a public good, as exemplified in Ostrom (2011). The extent of this 
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contrast varies, however, depending on an individual’s personality and on the cost 
to comply attached to a specific PEB. Thus, this paper analyzes the determinants of 
eight PEBs individually; it then focuses on different personality types to determine 
whether they respond differently to different incentives. 
1.2.1 Intrinsic motivation as a personality trait 
 
To act PE, an individual should be motivated either by her own moral call to behave 
responsibly or by external incentives that make the socially optimal option (i.e. 
behaving PE) more appealing to her. In other words, an individual may perceive that 
her best interest is aligned with that of society as a whole and choose to behave in a 
way that is morally consistent with this belief, while another person may identify 
personal well-being more strictly with her own individual pay-off. Ceteris paribus, 
the latter will typically perceive the contrast between individual and social 
rationality as wider and will need to be compensated with external incentives to 
behave PE. Based on this distinction, the literature has categorized individuals into 
either self-regarding actors or reciprocators (Fehr & Gintis, 2007). Moreover, 
individuals’ intrinsic motivation, as measured by their ascription to responsibility 
and awareness of consequences for their action, has been considered to the extent 
of a personality trait (Schwartz, 1977). Two studies have supported the idea that the 
response to policy interventions differs based on user type (Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek, 
& Rothengatter, 2005) and that communication campaigns can be ineffective if 
targeting those who are already intrinsically motivated (Arkesteijn & Oerlemans, 
2005). 
1.2.2 External conditions as a cost of compliance 
 
The external conditions in which a choice takes place are greatly, although not 
exclusively, defined by the cost of compliance. The perceived cost of adhering to an 
environmental norm clearly influences whether such a norm will be activated into 
behavior or not. Previous studies have highlighted that easier, less costly behaviors 
are more likely to be adopted (Attari, Dekay, Davidson, & Bruin, 2011) and that in 
these cases intrinsic motivation can be a strong predictor of PEB (Black et al., 1985). 
Conversely, higher costs of compliance act as a limiting factor that impedes intrinsic 
motivation from translating into actual behavior (Black et al., 1985). PEBs can imply 
relatively low costs of compliance, such as a minor habit change or a relatively small 
economic contribution (e.g. using reusable shopping bags), but they can also require 
a major lifestyle shift (e.g. such as switching to a vegan diet) or economic investment 
(e.g. opting for energy-efficient home appliances). Sometimes, behaving PE may 
involve both a somewhat costly habit change and economic gains (such as taking 
shorter showers to reduce water consumption as well as the water bill). In 
consideration of this, the antecedents of each PEB and their relative incidence may 
be different.  
 
The economic cost of compliance for non-income-neutral PEBs will be perceived 
differently relative to one’s financial situation; that is, the same cost will be 
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perceived as higher for a poorer individual. The impact of economic constraints on 
PEB has not been studied thoroughly. One might expect that individuals with 
financial constraints will engage in those PEBs that entail economic gains or savings 
(such as reducing energy consumption) and abstain from PEBs that imply an 
economic loss (such as purchasing green-label products). In line with these 
predictions, one study has documented a drastic decline in the purchase of green 
products in Greece since the start of the last economic crisis and reported that 
energy and water conservation behaviors instead are driven by financial 
preoccupations rather than environmental concern (Tilikidou & Delistavrou, 2014). 
However, this does not necessarily imply that financially distressed individuals are 
less concerned with protecting the environment. A review of the literature on the 
topic suggests that environmental concern does not vary with income (Kollmuss & 
Agyeman, 2002). Rather, it might be that environmental preoccupations are less 
likely to activate into PEB if an individual is distracted by other pressing personal 
circumstances, such as financial distress. As Cialdini’s theory of normative focus 
conjectures, a norm might be less likely to be activated if the individual’s attention is 
on the self as opposed to the situation and norm (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). 
This hypothesis is best tested on an income-neutral PEB, such as recycling, that is, 
whether economically distressed individuals would still abstain from recycling even 
in the absence of a financial cost of compliance. The extent of this “economic 
distraction” may also vary with levels of intrinsic motivation. These tests are 
undertaken in the next section of this paper. 
1.2.3 PEB as future-oriented behavior  
 
Given that PEB represents a personal investment in the future—in which future 
environmental quality is exchanged for a sacrifice today—, it can be considered as 
future-oriented behavior, such as quitting smoking, saving for retirement or 
practicing safe sex. The doubt is whether the individual recognizes when choosing 
to act PE the stakes that her behavior has in the future and whether she values that 
future. Considering that PEB often involves small, day-to-day, routine acts, it may be 
that the future implications of such acts are hidden from sight. Alternatively, it may 
be that the future is highly discounted, as suggested by the evidence that consumers 
fail to choose energy-saving appliances that could more than compensate for the 
higher capital costs (IPCC, 2014; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002).  
 
An experimental study showed that individuals cared more about the future and 
preserved more resources, in an hypothetical game in which resources were 
distributed among generations, when they could identify those representing future 
generations (Wolf & Dron, 2015). Similarly, in real life it can reasonably be expected 
that individuals who are parents are more concerned with preserving the 
environment, since they can relate to and emotionally connect on a daily basis with 
the generation next to theirs.  
 
Beliefs about the future could also influence one’s PEB. If a person has negative 
expectations regarding the future in general, she might be less likely to invest 
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energy in it, as the perceived likelihood of harvesting future results is low. A recent 
study showed for instance that individuals are less likely to delay gratification and 
hence invest in the future if they lose faith in the likelihood of future rewards for 
their efforts (Michaelson, de la Vega, Chatham, & Munakata, 2013).  
 
Chen (2013) proposed that the primary language that an individual speaks 
correlates with the likelihood that she will engage in future-oriented behavior. The 
author tested whether individuals who speak futureless languages—that is, 
languages with a weak future tense2—are more future-oriented and less likely to 
shift costs to the future, because they equate the future, grammatically and 
conceptually, to the present. He found that speakers of weak future tense languages 
are remarkably more likely to accumulate savings (39%) and stay physically active 
(29%) and less likely to smoke (24%) or be medically obese (13%) than speakers of 
languages with strong future tenses. Similar hypotheses on the relationship 
between language structure and intertemporal behavior were later confirmed by 
Chen et al. (2015) and Guin (2015).  
 
This paper tests whether an individual who has i) a personal stake in the future—
that is, is a parent; ii) an optimist attitude towards it; or iii) a more long-term-
oriented mindset—as proxied by her native language—is more likely to act PE.3  
2. Material and methods 
 
Similarly to other integrated models of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, this paper 
empirically analyzes the joint influence of internal and external factors on the 
likelihood that an individual i will behave PE.  
 
(1) 	 = 	


	

, 	

 
 
Eight PEBs are investigated separately: waste separation for recycling; reduction of 
waste—by avoiding over-packaged products and buying products with a longer life; 
reduction of domestic water consumption; reduction of domestic energy 
consumption; purchase of green-label products; purchase of local products; choice 
of a greener way to travel; and diminished car use. The response variables capture 
whether an individual reported having engaged in one of the eight behaviors in the 
previous month.  The causal variables in the model include: 
 
• indicators of intrinsic motivation;  
                                                        
2 Typically languages that do not require their speakers to mark future events with a future tense. 
For example, a German or a Mandarin speaker would predict rain using the present tense “It rains 
tomorrow” rather than using the future tense required for example by the English language: “It will 
rain tomorrow” or “It is going to rain tomorrow” (M. K. Chen, 2013). 
3 This paper does not test the existence of a causal link between individuals’ temporal preferences 
and their primary language but rather uses the latter as a proxy for a future-oriented mindset. 
Language is frequently used as a proxy for measuring cultural differences in the literature (V. 
Ginsburgh & Weber, 2014). 
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• proxies measuring the availability of green infrastructures and monetary 
incentives to act PE at the local level;  
• self-reported economic problems;  
• proxies measuring an individual’s general attitude towards the future; and 
• a series of demographic and other situational controls spanning from age 
and gender to internet use and self-assessed placement in society. 
 
Data were obtained from Eurobarometer’s 2014 survey on “Attitudes of Europeans 
towards environment” (European Commission, 2015), which surveyed 28,000 
respondents in the European Union’s 28 member states.  The respondents who did 
not reply and replied “do not know” to at least one of the questions relevant to this 
analysis were excluded from the data set; this reduced the sample size to nearly 
22,000 observations. The Eurobarometer data set provided all the variables 
included in the econometric model with two exceptions:  
 
• One of the variables measuring the availability of green infrastructures 
considers whether a country has adopted a container deposit collection 
system, for example BottleBill, which rewards individuals economically for 
returning used bottles and vessels. The list of countries that had adopted this 
legislation by 2004, the year of the Eurobarometer survey, was taken from 
the website BottleBill.org, maintained by the non-profit organization 
Container Recycling Institute  (Container Recycling Institute, 2016). The list 
was incremented using evidence from a European Parliament report on 
refunding schemes for drink containers (Schneider et al., 2011) (Schneider et 
al., 2011).  
• One of the variables measuring attitudes towards the future—specifically 
WeakFut—considers whether a respondent’s primary language is a weak 
future tense language. The variable was constructed by adopting the 
dichotomic language codification into weak and strong future tense 
introduced by Chen (2013, Appendix B, Table 1, p. 40).   
2.1 Econometric model A 
 
The relationships between the variables presented above are estimated with the 
following econometric model4:  
 
(2)  
, =  + , +  , + !"
#ℎ%& + '%&
+ ()* + +
, + -	
 + .
,
∗ 	
 	+ 0 + 12	3 + 42	3
+ 5	 + 67# + 83 + 9: +;<=>
+ ?"
#ℎ> + @%3 + A 
                                                        
4 A full list of survey questions extracted from the Eurobarometer database and utilized for this 
model is included in Annex 1.  
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where: 
 
Individual respondent: i=1 ,2, 3…, 21,954   1=individual 1 
2=individual 2 
3=individual 3 
     … 
21,954=individual 21,954 
 
PEB: b=1, 2, 3…, 9     1=Sum of the 8 PEBs  
       2=Waste separation for recycling  
       3=Reduce household waste 
4=Reduce water consumption (domestic) 
5=Reduce energy consumption 
(domestic) 
6=Buy green-label products 
7=Buy local products 
8=Choose green traveling 
9=Use car less 
 
 
Country: c=1, 2, 3…, 28     1=Austria 
2=Belgium 
3=Bulgaria 
           … 
28=United Kingdom 
 
2.1.1 The variables 
 
, is the respondent variable for individual i and behavior b. 
• For b=1 it is a 0–8 scale measuring how many of the 8 considered PEBs 
the individual reported having performed in the last month. 
• For b=2–9 it is a 0–1 dummy variable measuring whether the individual 
has performed PEB b in the last month. It is set to 0 if the respondent has 
not and 1 otherwise. 
 
Intrinsic motivation 
Intrinsic motivation is measured by three indicators inspired by Shalom Schwartz’s 
norm activation theory, one of the most prominent social psychology theories that 
have been applied to the understanding of PEB. The theory posits that an individual 
will behave in accordance with a norm if she recognizes the norm (e.g. she has 
internalized a social norm) and if the following two conditions simultaneously 
apply: (1) the person must have some awareness that her potential acts may have 
consequences for the welfare of others—awareness of consequences (AC); (2) the 
person must ascribe some responsibility for these acts and their consequences to 
herself—ascription of responsibility (AR) (Schwartz, 1968, p. 356).  
 
, measures the recognition of the environmental norm connected to the 
PEB examined; for example, the response to the question “Do you think it is a 
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priority for people to separate waste for recycling?” is used for recycling behavior. It 
is a 0–1 dummy variable.5 For b=2–9 it is set to 0 if the respondent did not recognize 
the norm and 1 otherwise. For b=1 it is set to 0 if the respondent did not recognize 
any environmental norm and 1 otherwise. 
 
 ,  measures whether the individual is concerned with the 
environmental aspect connected to the PEB examined; for example, the response to 
the question “Are you worried about the growing amount of waste?” is used for 
recycling behavior.6 For b=2–9 it is a 0–1 dummy variable, set to 0 if the respondent 
is not concerned and 1 otherwise. For b=1 it is a 0–5 scale corresponding to the 
amount of environmental concerns expressed by the respondent (set to a maximum 
of 5 in accordance with the survey design). 
 
"
#ℎ%&	is a 0–1 dummy variable measuring whether the individual ascribes 
completely to personal responsibility for caring about the environment. It is set to 0 
if the respondent does not and 1 otherwise. 
 
%& is	 a	 0–1	 dummy	 variable	 measuring	 whether	 the	 individual	 rejects	
entirely	personal	responsibility	for	caring	about	the	environment.	It	is	set	to	0	if	the	
respondent	does	not	and	1	otherwise. 
 
External conditions  
 
)* is	 a	 0–1	 dummy	 variable	 measuring	 whether	 the	 individual	 believes	
that	the	city	is	fulfilling	its	duty	in	preserving	the	environment.	It	can	be	considered	
as	 a	 proxy	 for	 the	 availability	 of	 green	 infrastructures	 at	 the	 local	 level,	 enabling	
citizens	 to	 behave	 PE	 e.g.	 the	 presence	 of	 recycling	 bins,	 public	 transport	 and	
cycling	tracks.	It	is	set	to	0	if	the	respondent	does	not	and	1	otherwise.	
 

, is	a	0–1	dummy	variable	measuring	whether	the	country7	c	where	the		
individual	resides	has	adopted	a	container	deposit	law	that	organizes	the	collection	
of	 cans	 and	 bottles	 and	 rewards	 users	 with	 a	 voucher	 for	 fuel	 or	 groceries.	 It	
primarily	 represents	 the	 availability	 of	 a	 green	 infrastructure	 tied	 to	 an	 economic	
incentive	to	 recycle,	but	 it	can	also	be	considered	as	a	proxy	for	the	availability	of	
other	green	infrastructures	e.g.	if	a	country	has	adopted	it,	it	may	be	more	likely	to	
have	adopted	other	national-level	green	infrastructures	as	well.	It	is	set	to	0	if	the	
country	where	the	individual	resides	has	not	adopted	it	and	1	otherwise.	 
                                                        
5 A list of the environmental norms corresponding to each behavior is available in Annex 2. 
6 A list of the environmental concerns corresponding to each behavior is available in Annex 2. 
7 As of 2014, the year of the Eurobarometer survey, only 11 of the 28 surveyed countries had 
adopted a Bottle Bill system: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden. Despite their exclusion from the Container Recycling 
Instituteʼs list (2016), the authors decided to include Hungary and Cyprus in the list following 
evidence reported by Schneider et al. (2011). 
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 is a 0–1 dummy variable measuring whether the individual reported 
problems paying her bills most of the times in the last year. It is set to 0 if the 
respondent did not and 1 otherwise. 
 

(,) ∗ 	
() is the interaction term between the two dummy variables 
BottleBill and FinProb. It measures whether the fact of having economic problems 
and living in a BottleBill country has a positive effect on self-reported PEB. If 
significant, it would imply that economic incentives are effective in increasing PEB 
for individuals who are more sensitive to small economic rewards. 
Attitudes towards the future  
 
() is a 0–1 dummy variable measuring whether the individual has at least 
one child. It is set to 0 if the respondent does not and 1 otherwise.  
 
2	3() is a 0–1 dummy variable measuring whether the individual is a national 
of a country where the main language has a weak future tense.8 It is set to 0 if the 
respondent is not and 1 otherwise.  
 
2	3() is a 0–1 dummy variable measuring whether the individual has 
reported having negative expectations regarding the future of her own country. It is 
set to 0 if the respondent has not and 1 otherwise. 
Demographic controls  
 
	() is a 0–1 dummy variable capturing whether the individual is female. It is 
set to 0 if the respondent is not and 1 otherwise. 
 
7#() is a continuous variable reporting the respondent’s age at the time of the 
interview. 
 
3() is a 1–10 index reporting the respondent’s age when she left full-time 
education. 1 corresponds to “no full-time education” and 10 to “22 years or more” or 
“still studying.” 
 
:() is a 1–7 index reporting how the respondent uses the Internet. 1 
corresponds to “no internet access” and 7 to “every day/almost every day.” 
 
<=>() and "
#ℎ>() are two 0–1, mutually exclusive dummy variables 
                                                        
8 In only 8 of the 28 countries surveyed, a weak future tense language is spoken: Belgium (Dutch and 
German but not French), Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Estonia (Estonian but not Russian), 
Finland (both Finnish and Swedish), Germany and Portugal. In the case of multilingual countries, the 
individual-level dummy reads 1 only if the interview was undertaken in a weak future tense language 
and 0 otherwise. 
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capturing whether the individual describes herself as part of the lower and higher 
class of society, respectively. It is set to 0 if the respondent does not and 1 
otherwise. If statistically significant, these coefficients would imply that belonging to 
a lower or higher social status has an impact on the likelihood of behaving PE 
compared with being part of the middle class. 
 
%3() is a 0–1 dummy variable capturing whether the individual lives in a rural 
area or village (as opposed to a small–large town or city). It is set to 0 if the 
respondent does not and 1 otherwise. 
 
k is the intercept. 
 
A represents the error term.  
 
2.2 Econometric model B 
 
This model represents a simplified version of the previous one. In this case the 
regression is run on groups clustered depending on their level of ascription to 
responsibility for caring for the environment. Three levels of responsibility are 
identified, "
#ℎ%&() and %&() as above and m
3%&(), which captures 
the values in between the two extremes. Given that the cluster group that rejects 
responsibility in full is rather small, the variables included in the model were 
reduced for the sake of parsimony.  
(3)  
(,) =  + (,) +  (,) + ()*() + +
(,)
+ -	
() + 0() + 5	() + 67#() + 83()
+ 9:() + @%3() + A 
 
 
for   "
#ℎ%&() = 1  
   m
3%&() = 1 
   %&() = 1 
 
where m
3%&() is a 0–1 dummy variable measuring whether the individual 
accepts a medium level of personal responsibility for caring about the environment. 
It is set to 0 if the respondent does not and 1 otherwise. 
 
Comparing the results across the three equations for a given PEB should give an 
indication of the interaction and conditional effects that varying degrees of 
ascription of responsibility have on other indicators of intrinsic motivation and 
external factors. This analysis contributes to the understanding of whether intrinsic 
motivation is a precondition for PEB and whether its absence has an impact on the 
effectiveness of monetary incentives and green infrastructures. 
3. Results and discussion 
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3.1 Model A 
 
The tables below summarize the estimated results of model A for the eight PEBs 
considered in this analysis. Country dummies, representing the 28 nations in the 
sample, were added to account for country fixed effects. The results displayed in 
Table 1 show the estimated parameters when fixed effects are included in the 
model. However, since the country dummies naturally collided with the variables 
that are country dependent—such as the presence of green infrastructures in the 
territory, beliefs regarding the future of one’s country and the grammatical features 
of the main languages spoken in the country (i.e., EcoInfra, BottleBill, WeakFut and 
BleakFut)—the results were also calculated without fixed effects; see Table 2. 
 
The checks for collinearity did not reveal near dependencies among the regressors 
used. Pearson pairwise correlation showed low correlation in all cases with two 
exceptions, BottleBill and WeakFut correlated with 63% and LowClass and FinProb 
correlated with 31%. However, all the VIF and Condition Index values were well 
below the threshold values for multicollinearity of 10 and 30, respectively.9 
 
The parameters in the model were successful in explaining 8–26% of the variation 
in the response variable, as shown by the pseudo-R2 values in Table 1. In the 
absence of country fixed effects, the variance explained in the model lowers to 6.5–
15%, a level that, given the complexity of human behavior, is considered significant 
for studies such as this, with individual persons as units of analysis and a 
heterogeneous sample (Langbein, 2015, p. 141). 
 
The rationale for analyzing eight PEBs separately captures the intuition—supported 
by Oskamp et al. (1991)—that environmental efforts and attitudes are fractioned 
into specific components that are peculiar to each behavior; that is, the antecedents 
of a PEB and their relative importance vary with each behavior. Nevertheless, there 
may also be findings that are generalizable to most PEBs. The latter are captured in 
equation 0, in which the response variable represents the sum of the PEBs adopted 
by the individual (Tables 1 and 2). 
 
 
  
                                                        
9 The results of the collinearity tests are available on request from the authors. 
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Table 1. Impact of internal motivation and external factors on 8 PEBs (with country fixed effects)     
  
O
LS
 
–
 
su
m
 
o
f 
al
l P
EB
s 
0–
8 
LO
G
IT
 
–
 
w
as
te
 
se
pa
ra
tio
n
 
fo
r 
re
cy
cl
in
g 
LO
G
IT
 
–
 
w
as
te
 
se
pa
ra
tio
n
 
fo
r 
re
cy
cl
in
g 
LO
G
IT
 
–
 
re
du
ce
 
w
as
te
 
LO
G
IT
 
–
 
re
du
ce
 
w
at
e
r 
ho
u
s
e 
co
n
su
m
p.
 
LO
G
IT
 
–
 
re
du
ce
 
en
er
gy
 
ho
u
s
e 
co
n
su
m
p.
 
LO
G
IT
 
–
 
bu
y 
gr
ee
n
 
ho
u
se
 
pr
o
ds
 
LO
G
IT
 
–
 
bu
y 
lo
ca
l p
ro
ds
 
LO
G
IT
 
–
 
c
ho
o
s
e 
gr
e
en
 
tr
av
e
lin
g 
LO
G
IT
 
–
 
u
se
 
ca
r 
le
ss
 
 0 1.a 1.b 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Constant -0.956***  (0.180) 
-0.993***  
(0.185) 
0.399***  
(0.142) 
-2.108***  
(0.170) 
-1.617***  
(0.167) 
-1.563***  
(0.160) 
-3.185***  
(0.194) 
-2.055***  
(0.174) 
-1.494***  
(0.171) 
-2.686***  
(0.193) 
Norm 1.383***  (0.141) 
1.050***  
(0.034) 
1.040***  
(0.034) 
0.480***  
(0.035) 
0.864***  
(0.041) 
0.802***  
(0.030) 
0.859***  
(0.037) 
1.180***  
(0.035) 
1.029***  
(0.031) 
0.558***  
(.035) 
EnvWorry 0.277***  (0.009) 
0.158***  
(0.034) 
0.157***  
(0.034) 
0.131***   
(0.031) 
0.194***   
(0.033) 
0.166***   
(0.031) 
0.253***   
(0.035) 
0.144***   
(0.043) 
0.096***   
(0.032) 
0.127***      
(0.049) 
HighResp 0.548***  (0.022) 
0.389***  
(0.036) 
0.416***  
(0.035) 
0.399***   
(0.032) 
0.353***   
(0.031) 
0.327***   
(0.030) 
0.503***   
(0.036) 
0.309***   
(0.031) 
0.388***   
(0.031) 
0.329***   
(0.036) 
NoResp -0.436***  (0.055) 
-0.525***  
(0.082) 
-0.563***  
(0.081) 
-0.526***   
(0.097) 
-0.304***   
(0.084) 
-0.581***   
(0.081) 
-0.331***   
(0.114) 
-0.378***   
(0.086) 
-0.209***   
(0.085) 
-0.209**   
(0.107) 
EcoInfra -0.013    (0.021) 
0.108***  
(0.035) 
0.087***  
(0.034) 
-0.051*     
(0.031) 
0.024     
(0.031) 
-0.017     
(0.030) 
-0.152***     
(0.036) 
-0.024        
(0.031) 
-0.010     
(0.031) 
-0.101***     
(0.036) 
BottleBill  0.240**  (0.112) 
0.033   
(0.184) 
-0.034   
(0.179) 
0.509***   
(0.160) 
-0.332**   
(0.160) 
-0.077        
(0.155) 
0.289a   
(0.184) 
0.396**   
(0.163) 
0.386**   
(0.163) 
0.468***   
(0.182) 
FinProb -0.046   (0.038) 
-0.278***   
(0.060) 
-0.413***   
(0.050) 
-0.173***    
(0.054) 
0.187**    
(0.049) 
0.109**    
(0.048) 
-0.111*   
(0.063) 
-0.030     
(0.051) 
0.103**     
(0.050) 
0.025      
(0.060) 
BottleBill* 
FinProb 
0.157**   
(0.078) 
0.067   
(0.118)         
Parent  0.099***   (0.022) 
0.160***   
(0.036)  
0.065**  
(0.033) 
0.049   
(0.032) 
0.122***   
(0.031) 
0.088**   
(0.037) 
0.040      
(0.032) 
-0.005   
(0.032) 
0.088**   
(0.037) 
WeakFut -0.209**   (0.086) 
-0.561***   
(0.147)  
-0.340***   
(0.118) 
-0.271***     
(0.120) 
-0.342***      
(0.119) 
-0.186      
(0.140) 
-0.578***      
(0.122) 
0.719***   
(0.127) 
0.424***      
(0.141) 
BleakFut -0.020   (0.022) 
-0.110***   
(0.036)  
-0.045     
(0.033) 
0.025    
(0.032) 
0.003     
(0.030) 
0.003     
(0.037) 
-0.002     
(0.032) 
0.024     
(0.032) 
0.052     
(0.037) 
Female  0.258***   (0.021) 
0.145***   
(0.034)  
0.218***   
(0.031) 
0.257***   
(0.030) 
0.204***   
(0.029) 
0.329***   
(0.035) 
0.225***   
(0.030) 
0.192***   
(0.030) 
-0.195***   
(0.035) 
Age   0.011***   (0.001) 
0.015***   
(0.001)  
0.007***   
(0.001) 
0.010***   
(0.001) 
0.009***   
(0.001) 
0.005***   
(0.001) 
0.012***   
(0.001) 
-0.005***   
(0.001) 
0.003***   
(0.001) 
Edu   0.041***   (0.005) 
0.045***   
(0.007)  
0.028***   
(0.007) 
-0.003   
(0.006) 
0.025***   
(0.006) 
0.064***   
(0.008) 
0.043***   
(0.007) 
0.034***   
(0.007) 
0.019***   
(0.008) 
NetUse 0.049***   (0.006) 
0.058***   
(0.010)  
0.034***   
(0.009) 
0.017**       
(0.009) 
0.044***       
(0.008) 
0.071***       
(0.011) 
0.060***       
(0.009) 
0.011   
(0.009) 
0.070***       
(0.011) 
HighClass 0.048*   (0.025) 
-0.057   
(0.042)  
0.061*   
(0.037) 
-0.042  
(0.037) 
-0.022      
(0.035) 
0.185***      
(0.040) 
0.071**      
(0.037) 
0.045   
(0.037) 
0.015     
(0.041) 
LowClass -0.098***   (0.029) 
-0.126***   
(0.046)  
-0.108***   
(0.044) 
-0.007  
(0.041) 
-0.099***   
(0.040) 
-0.174***      
(0.053) 
-0.083**      
(0.042) 
0.006  
(0.042) 
-0.104**   
(0.051) 
Rural -0.027       (0.022) 
-0.027   
(0.036)  
0.024 
(0.033) 
-0.046   
(0.032) 
0.021   
(0.031) 
0.012   
(0.037) 
0.102***   
(0.032) 
-0.220***   
(0.032) 
-0.080**  
(0.038) 
Pseudo R2 20.5% 26.3% 24.9% 10.8% 11.7% 11.6% 18.3% 17.5% 14.8% 8.1% 
F-test/  
-2 log 
likelihood 
124.391  22039.391 
22286.65
9 
25780.21
4 
27028.84
3 
28423.62
3 
21268.10
4 
26344.48
5 
26449.00
1 
21264.65
5 
No. of 
observations 21,953 21,954 21,954 21,954 21,954 21,954 21,954 21,954 21,954 21,954 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, a p=0.12, coefficient had near-marginal 
significance. For equations 1.a–8, the Nagelkerke R2 and McFadden -2 log likelihood are reported. Equation 0 
shows an adjusted R2 and F-test of overall significance.  
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Table 2. Impact of internal motivation and external factors on 8 PEBs (without country fixed effects)      
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 0 1.a 1.b 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Constant -1.216***  (0.162) 
-1.506***  
(0.112) 
0.087***  
(0.035) 
-1.919***  
(0.108) 
-1.336***  
(0.103) 
-1.380***  
(0.100) 
-3.700***  
(0.125) 
-2.187***  
(0.104) 
-1.623***  
(0.105) 
-2.742***  
(0.123) 
Norm 1.449***  (0.145) 
1.022***  
(0.032) 
0.998***  
(0.031) 
0.549***  
(0.034) 
0.935***  
(0.040) 
0.824***  
(0.029) 
0.857***  
(0.036) 
1.231***  
(0.034) 
1.019***  
(0.030) 
0.587***  
(.034) 
EnvWorry 0.300***  (0.009) 
0.130***  
(0.032) 
0.125***  
(0.031) 
0.120***   
(0.030) 
0.283***   
(0.031) 
0.212***   
(0.030) 
0.267***   
(0.034) 
0.151***   
(0.041) 
0.092***   
(0.031) 
0.169***      
(0.048) 
HighResp 0.573***  (0.022) 
0.446***  
(0.033) 
0.493***  
(0.032) 
0.415***   
(0.030) 
0.350***   
(0.030) 
0.365***   
(0.029) 
0.505***   
(0.034) 
0.259***   
(0.030) 
0.355***   
(0.030) 
0.358***   
(0.035) 
NoResp -0.460***  (0.057) 
-0.558***  
(0.077) 
-0.631***  
(0.076) 
-0.558***   
(0.096) 
-0.315***   
(0.082) 
-0.575***   
(0.080) 
-0.362***   
(0.113) 
-0.341***   
(0.084) 
-0.184**   
(0.084) 
-0.238**   
(0.106) 
EcoInfra 0.049**     (0.022) 
0.222***  
(0.032) 
0.235***  
(0.031) 
-0.002     
(0.030) 
0.050*     
(0.029) 
0.000     
(0.028) 
-0.103***     
(0.034) 
-0.007        
(0.030) 
0.036     
(0.030) 
-0.081**     
(0.035) 
BottleBill  0.101***   (0.030) 
-0.191***   
(0.044) 
0.102***   
(0.033) 
0.378***   
(0.039) 
-0.245***   
(0.039) 
-0.160***        
(0.038) 
0.291***   
(0.046) 
0.102***   
(0.039) 
0.371***   
(0.039) 
0.352***   
(0.045) 
FinProb -0.157***   (0.038) 
-0.443***   
(0.053) 
-0.657***   
(0.044) 
-0.272***    
(0.051) 
0.097**    
(0.046) 
0.029    
(0.045) 
-0.200***   
(0.061) 
0.007     
(0.048) 
0.036     
(0.048) 
0.056      
(0.058) 
BottleBill* 
FinProb 
0.167**   
(0.080) 
0.174a   
(0.111)         
Parent  0.070***   (0.023) 
0.102***   
(0.034)  
0.044  
(0.032) 
0.070**   
(0.031) 
0.109***   
(0.030) 
0.065*   
(0.036) 
0.003      
(0.031) 
-0.043   
(0.032) 
0.065*   
(0.037) 
WeakFut 0.088***   (0.031) 
0.275***   
(0.046)  
-0.228***   
(0.043) 
0.104***     
(0.042) 
0.328***      
(0.040) 
0.041      
(0.049) 
-0.214***      
(0.042) 
0.050   
(0.042) 
0.101**      
(0.048) 
BleakFut -0.038*   (0.022) 
-0.088***   
(0.032)  
-0.105***     
(0.030) 
0.046 a     
(0.030) 
-0.017     
(0.029) 
0.030     
(0.034) 
-0.090***     
(0.030) 
0.025     
(0.030) 
0.113***     
(0.035) 
Female  0.262***   (0.021) 
0.149***   
(0.032)  
0.214***   
(0.030) 
0.236***   
(0.029) 
0.190***   
(0.028) 
0.321***   
(0.034) 
0.232***   
(0.029) 
0.202***   
(0.030) 
-0.201***   
(0.034) 
Age   0.013***   (0.001) 
0.019***   
(0.001)  
0.007***   
(0.001) 
0.008***   
(0.001) 
0.009***   
(0.001) 
0.010***   
(0.001) 
0.012***   
(0.001) 
-0.003***   
(0.001) 
0.005***   
(0.001) 
Edu   0.016***   (0.005) 
0.003   
(0.007)  
0.002   
(0.006) 
-0.032***   
(0.006) 
-0.005   
(0.006) 
0.067***   
(0.007) 
0.042***   
(0.006) 
0.040***   
(0.006) 
0.012*   
(0.007) 
NetUse 0.081***   (0.006) 
0.115***   
(0.009)  
0.053***   
(0.009) 
0.018**       
(0.008) 
0.060***       
(0.008) 
0.113***       
(0.010) 
0.065***       
(0.008) 
0.025***   
(0.009) 
0.092***       
(0.010) 
HighClass 0.036   (0.026) 
-0.012   
(0.039)  
0.014   
(0.035) 
-0.078**   
(0.035) 
-0.041      
(0.034) 
0.227***      
(0.038) 
-0.016      
(0.035) 
0.103***   
(0.035) 
0.061     
(0.040) 
LowClass -0.164***   (0.029) 
-0.257***   
(0.042)  
-0.186***   
(0.043) 
0.002  
(0.040) 
-0.132***   
(0.039) 
-0.232***      
(0.052) 
-0.098**      
(0.041) 
0.022  
(0.041) 
-0.144***   
(0.050) 
Rural -0.003       (0.022) 
0.015   
(0.033)  
0.037 
(0.031) 
0.003   
(0.030) 
0.012   
(0.029) 
-0.014   
(0.035) 
0.065**   
(0.030) 
-0.175***   
(0.031) 
-0.045  
(0.036) 
Pseudo R2 14.9% 13.9% 11.2% 6.1% 7.0% 8.4% 13.9% 11.3% 11.8% 6.5% 
F-test/  
-2 log 
likelihood 
214.758 24246.753 
24714.22
6 
26573.58
0 
27853.71
3 
29000.93
5 
21985.00
3 
27465.21
6 
26973.11
9 
21492.48
3 
No. of 
observations 21,953 21,954 21,954 21,954 21,954 21,954 21,954 21,954 21,954 21,954 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, a p=0.12, coefficient had near-marginal 
significance. For equations 1.a–8, the Nagelkerke R2 and McFadden -2 log likelihood are reported. Equation 0 
shows an adjusted R2 and F-test of overall significance.  
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3.1.1 Internal motivation and green infrastructures 
The most notable finding is that, across all the PEBs observed, the estimated 
parameters for intrinsic motivation—that is, Norm, HighResp and NoResp—
dominate the external factors (they have the highest absolute value among the 
estimated regressors).10 All the intrinsic motivation indicators are statistically 
significant and have the expected sign: recognition of the norm (Norm), 
environmental worry (EnvWorry) and personal responsibility (HighResp) correlate 
positively with the dependent variable, whereas the NoResp coefficient has a 
negative sign. The biggest impact is represented by the recognition of the norm, 
followed by the two personal responsibility coefficients. 
 
The availability of green infrastructures, as represented by the EcoInfra and 
BottleBill coefficients, is relevant to seven out of the eight PEBs observed, that is one 
or both coefficients are statistically significant in each equation. The sign of the two 
coefficients combined is positive in all cases with the exception of “reduce water 
consumption” (eq. 4), which is unexpectedly negative. Potentially, the presence of a 
Bottle Bill—and of a deposit charge on bottled liquids—may have induced 
individuals to consume more tap water at home rather than buying bottled water. 
The availability of external green infrastructures appears to be irrelevant to 
household energy-saving behavior. While this is in part obvious, it also shows that 
the presence of an external apparatus, which facilitates certain PEBs, does not 
necessarily induce the adoption of other unrelated PEBs. In Table 2 the BottleBill 
coefficient is also negative for “recycling” (eq. 3.a), although this is due to 
collinearity between the variable and its interaction term. Dropping the interaction 
term in equation 3.b returns a statistically significant positive coefficient for 
BottleBill.  
 
3.1.2 Financial constraints  
Financial constraints affect the purchase of green products, recycling and waste 
reduction negatively—the coefficient of FinProb is statistically significant and 
negative in these equations. While it is unsurprising that financially distressed 
individuals are less likely to purchase green products or energy-saving appliances, 
which are often more expensive, the negative correlation with income-neutral 
behaviors, such as recycling, was unexpected. However, it is consistent with the 
hypothesis that, if an individual is distracted by more pressing personal 
circumstances, she is less likely to act in a norm-consistent way (Cialdini et al., 1990, 
p. 204). The coefficient is statistically significant and positive for “reduce water 
consumption,” “reduce electricity consumption” and “choose greener ways of 
traveling,” which is also expected considering that these behaviors reflect positively 
in savings.  
 
                                                        
10 Since all the variables are dummies, except the demographic controls for age, education and 
internet use, the analysis concerning the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is straightforward. 
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Surprisingly, when country fixed effects are excluded, the FinProb coefficient is not 
statistically significant in the “reduce energy consumption” and “choose greener 
ways of traveling” equations (Table 2). This indicates the presence of national-level 
differences: some countries may be better than others at redistributing the 
economic savings of these behaviors to the end-user, for example by adopting 
pricing schemes that reward lower energy consumption, and making driving a car 
more costly than the public transport options available or at least making public 
transport an option. 
 
Several European countries have adopted pricing schemes whereby energy tariffs 
are determined by market prices, which vary depending on the time of the day and 
the source used, and they generally have an important fixed component that leads to 
decreasing average prices for the consumer. The user has less control over the final 
bill and is more likely to control it by changing the usage times rather than by 
reducing the consumption per se. For example, Filippini (2011) found that 
households are highly responsive to the changes in off-peak and high-peak energy 
prices and adapt their energy use accordingly. On the other hand, water tariffs in 
OECD countries tend to follow constant volumetric pricing, with a growing trend to 
apply increasing block tariff systems, while the relevance of fixed charges has 
declined significantly (OECD, 2009). Volumetric pricing schemes, and particularly 
increasing block tariffs, encourage a reduction in water consumption.  
 
In the recycling equations, the FinProb coefficient is bigger than the sum of the two 
coefficients for green infrastructures, thus suggesting that an individual’s ability to 
focus on PEB may be more important than the PEB’s enabling conditions. If 
economic problems distract individuals from acting consistently with 
environmental norms, the question arises of whether explicitly linking a PEB to an 
economic incentive can effectively restore the attention to such behavior. The 
intuition is that the attention of an economically distressed individual may be 
attracted more easily if a behavior is framed in economic rather than in normative 
terms and that she will be relatively more sensitive to an economic contribution, 
however small. The interaction term in eqs 0 and 1.a between BottleBill and FinProb 
tests this hypothesis (Table 2). The coefficient is statistically significant with a 
positive sign. It suggests that economic incentives are effective in limiting the 
negative impact of economic difficulties on PEB11 This last point is corroborated by 
the descriptive statistics from the database (European Commission, 2015) showing 
that:  
i) Overall, individuals with economic problems are much less likely to recycle 
per se: only 59% of them recycle compared with 73% in the rest of the 
sample.  
                                                        
11 The interaction term is included only in eqs 0 and 1.a, as it is not relevant to other behaviors. 
BottleBill works well as a proxy for other green infrastructures across all PEBs; however, when used 
to represent specifically an economic incentive for a PEB in the interaction term, it obviously refers 
to recyling only. 
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ii) However, if an individual with economic problems resides in a Bottle Bill 
country, she is 2 percentage points more likely to recycle her trash (60%) 
than if she resides elsewhere (58%).  
iii) The effect of residing in a Bottle Bill country is positive but weaker among 
individuals who do not report economic problems (only a 1 percentage point 
increase). 
 
3.1.3 Attitudes towards the future 
The coefficient for Parent is statistically significant and positive for five of the PEBs 
considered. In general, being a parent is associated with a 0.1 unit increase in the 
number of PEBs adopted (eq. 0, Table 1). This confirms the hypothesis that 
individuals who can identify with the generation next to theirs through an emphatic 
relationship are more likely to consider future outcomes and thus behave PE.  
 
The coefficient for WeakFut (Table 2) is statistically significant for seven equations 
out of nine: speakers of a weak future tense language 27% more likely to recycle; 
33% more likely to reduce energy use in the house; 10% more likely to reduce 
water consumption; and 10% more likely to reduce car use. They are, however, less 
likely to purchase local products (-21%) and to reduce household waste (-23%). 
Overall, speaking a weak future tense language is associated with a 0.09 unit 
increase in the number of PEBs adopted. As Chen (2013) suggested, individuals who 
are required by their native language to equate present and future events 
grammatically when they speak are more prone to engage in future-oriented 
behavior. Our results suggest that this also holds for PEB, possibly because a 
language’s grammatical features reflect the cultural mindset of its speakers and 
their future orientedness.  
 
Finally, BleakFut (Table 2) is statistically significant for five of the PEBs considered. 
Future pessimists are less likely to reduce their household waste, recycle and buy 
local products, whereas they are more likely to reduce their car use and water 
consumption.12 Overall, being pessimist about the future of one’s own country is 
associated with a 0.04 unit decrease in the number of PEBs adopted. 
 
Thus, overall the three indicators for future orientedness support the hypothesis 
that individuals who have a stake in the future, that have a more positive attitude 
towards it and those who have a more future-oriented mindset are more likely to 
behave PE. However, there are differences depending on the behavior observed.  
 
                                                        
12 The variable measures general beliefs about the future of one’s country. The survey question may 
have been interpreted in economic terms by the respondents. This could explain why future 
pessimists are more likely to decrease the use of their car or their water use, if they expect the 
economic outlook to worsen, they may consider at least engaging in PEBs that entail cost savings. A 
more precise question regarding beliefs about the future of the environment may lead to more 
accurate estimations. 
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3.1.4 Other socio-demographic factors 
Additionally, the series of socio-demographic controls shows the following: 
 
Being a female correlates positively with all the PEBs with the exception of “use car 
less,” suggesting that women are more likely to adopt any PEBs but not to renounce 
driving their car. This finding is supported in the literature on altruistic behavior, 
such as PEBs, which finds that women are more likely to engage in other-regarding 
behavior (Hunter, Hatch, & Johnson, 2004; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002) and hold 
more PE attitudes (Dietz, Stern, & Guagnano, 1998; Vaske, Donnelly, Williams, & 
Jonker, 2001). 
 
Age correlates positively with all the PEBs observed except for “choose green 
traveling,” suggesting that older people are in general more observant of 
environmental norms, except when it comes to considering alternatives to their own 
car. 
 
Predictably, the level of education also increases engagement in nearly all the PEBs, 
except water saving. However, there appear to be national-level differences in the 
efficacy of education on PEB; that is, the effect is weaker when country fixed effects 
are excluded (Table 2). Cost-saving behaviors, such as water and energy saving, are 
either affected negatively or not influenced at all by education, a finding that is 
consistent with  Chankrajang and Muttarak (2017). 
 
All the PEBs—except green traveling—increase with the frequency of internet use, 
suggesting that easy and quick access to a large amount of information benefits 
environmental engagement.  
 
One’s self-assessed position in society correlates positively with nearly all the PEBs. 
Individuals who identify with the lower classes of society are 10–26% less likely to 
behave PE than the middle class, depending on the specific behavior considered 
(with the exception of water saving and the use of green transport). However, a 
higher social status does not necessarily translate into higher PEB compared with 
the middle class: a higher social status is only connected to a higher probability of 
reducing waste and purchasing green and local. Further, the results obtained 
without country fixed effects show that higher classes are 8% less likely to reduce 
their water use. As social status is usually a proxy for income, one might expect 
price, even in a volumetric tariff scheme, to be an ineffective means to induce water-
saving behavior among richer individuals. 
 
The likelihood of behaving PE is also influenced by urban settings. People living in 
rural areas are less likely to reduce their car use or use alternative ways of traveling 
(eqs 7 and 8), possibly because of the lack of alternatives, but they are more likely to 
buy local products, perhaps due to easier access to local agricultural produce (eq. 6). 
 
 19
3.2 Model B 
 
Table 3 summarizes the estimated results for model B. Logit split regressions are 
performed on three groups (a, b, c) clustered by their level of personal ascription to 
responsibility for preserving the environment.  The three regressions are performed 
on three PEBs that differ in the way in which they affect income: 1) recycling 
(income neutral); 2) water saving (income positive); and 3) purchase of green-label 
products (income negative).  
 
Table 3. Impact of external conditions on three PEBs conditional on the degree of internal motivation        
  
Income-neutral PEB 
Waste separation for 
recycling  (LOGIT) 
Income-positive PEB 
Reduce water consumption  
(LOGIT) 
Income-negative PEB 
Buy green-label products 
(LOGIT) 
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 1.a 1.b 1.c 2.a 2.b 2.c 3.a 3.b 3.c 
Constant -1.191***      (0.171) 
-1.856***      
(0.141) 
-2.103****      
(0.482) 
-0.974***      
(0.146) 
-1.305***      
(0.135) 
-1.285***      
(0.503) 
-3.433***      
(0.167) 
-3.714***      
(0.172) 
-4.292***      
(0.764) 
Norm 0.891***      (.051) 
1.084***      
(0.042) 
1.315***      
(0.155) 
0.864***      
(0.062) 
0.974***      
(0.055) 
1.162***      
(0.202) 
0.721***      
(0.049) 
0.996***      
(0.052) 
1.365***      
(0.232) 
EnvWorry 0.097**         (0.050) 
0.145***         
(0.042) 
0.008         
(0.156) 
0.222***         
(0.045) 
0.354***         
(0.044) 
0.224             
(0.176) 
0.294***             
(0.046) 
0.233***             
(0.049) 
0.260               
(0.227) 
EcoInfra 0.312***         (0.051) 
0.205***         
(0.042) 
0.237         
(0.155) 
0.087**            
(0.043) 
0.011            
(0.041) 
-0.005            
(0.164) 
-0.134***            
(0.047) 
-0.049              
(0.050) 
-0.288              
(0.232) 
BottleBill  -0.027         (0.054) 
-0.010         
(0.045) 
-0.038         
(0.161) 
-0.220***         
(0.045)  
-0.200***         
(0.044) 
0.089          
(0.169) 
0.354***         
(0.048) 
0.350***         
(0.052) 
-0.137         
(0.235)  
FinProb -0.518***         (0.072) 
-0.479***         
(.063) 
-0.646***         
(0.207) 
0.104a       
(0.066) 
0.123**         
(.062) 
-0.017            
(0.212) 
-0.262***             
(0.079) 
-0.324***             
(0.091) 
-0.533            
(.348) 
Parent  0.080          (0.053) 
0.113***         
(0.045) 
0.149        
(0.167) 
0.048             
(0.046) 
0.088**            
(0.044) 
0.030            
(0.178) 
0.075            
(0.050) 
0.052             
(0.053) 
0.367             
(0.241) 
Female  0.215***         (0.051) 
0.127***         
(0.042) 
-0.062         
(0.157) 
0.268***         
(0.043) 
0.215***         
(0.041) 
0.247         
(0.165) 
0.366***         
(0.048) 
0.248***         
(0.050) 
0.384*        
(0.229) 
Age   0.020***         (0.002) 
0.021***         
(0.002) 
0.014***         
(0.005) 
0.009***         
(0.002) 
0.008***         
(0.002) 
0.002         
(0.006) 
0.013***         
(0.002) 
0.009***         
(0.002) 
0.012         
(0.008) 
Edu   0.005         (0.010) 
0.009         
(0.009) 
0.004         
(0.031) 
-0.038***         
(0.009) 
-0.032***         
(0.008) 
-0.044         
(0.033) 
0.078***         
(0.010) 
0.080***         
(0.011) 
0.044         
(0.046) 
NetUse 0.117***         (0.014) 
-0.135***         
(0.012) 
0.128***         
(0.041) 
0.022*         
(0.012) 
0.014         
(0.011) 
-0.007         
(0.042) 
0.128***         
(0.014) 
0.120***         
(0.015) 
0.169***        
(0.062) 
Rural 0.016         (0.052) 
-0.020         
(0.044) 
0.209         
(0.158) 
-0.037         
(0.044) 
0.029         
(0.042) 
0.088         
(0.165) 
-0.008         
(0.049) 
-0.017         
(0.052) 
-0.065         
(0.236) 
Pseudo R2 9.1% 12.7% 18.8% 5.2% 6.7% 7.8% 11.0% 10.8% 13.9% 
-2 log 
likelihood 9826.220 
13467.59
4 1011.184 
12625.52
3 14293.057 930.315 10013.917 
10462.21
4 545.701 
No. of 
observatio
ns 
9,567 11,568 819 9,567 11,568 819 9,567 11,568 819 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, a p=0.11, coefficient had near-marginal 
significance. The Nagelkerke R2 and McFadden -2 log likelihood are reported at the end of the table.  
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The rationale is to assess whether people with differing levels of ascription to 
responsibility react differently to external conditions and whether changes apply to 
different kinds of PEB, as defined by their effect on income.  
Recognition of the norm (Norm) is the most important factor across groups and 
behaviors (statistically significant coefficient and greatest in magnitude). In all three 
behaviors, the coefficient for EnvWorry is not statistically significant for the NoResp 
group. This would suggest that, without a minimum level of ascription to 
responsibility, environmental concern alone is not conducive to adopting PEB.  
 
The availability of “green infrastructures” (captured by EcoInfra and BottleBill) is 
relevant only to medium/high levels of ascription of responsibility (the two 
coefficients are not statistically significant in the three regressions for the NoResp 
group). This implies that, without a minimum level of motivation, green 
infrastructures and external incentives alone are not effective. The effect of green 
infrastructures is positive for medium/high levels of ascription of responsibility in 
the case of income-negative and income-neutral behaviors. Green infrastructures, 
however, affect income-saving behaviors negatively for medium/high levels of 
responsibility.  
 
As noted in model A, financial difficulties exert a negative impact on income-neutral 
and income-negative behaviors and a positive impact on income-positive behaviors. 
However, the impact of financial difficulties differs among groups. Financially 
distressed individuals are: 
• 65% less likely to recycle if they do not ascribe to any responsibility for the 
environment than if they claim high responsibility (-52%); 
• 10% more likely to reduce water consumption if they claim high 
responsibility for the environment than if they do not—the coefficient is not 
statistically significant; 
• 32% less likely to buy green-label products if they ascribe to a medium level 
of responsibility for the environment than if they claim a high level of 
responsibility (-26%). 
Thus, financial problems influence more heavily the behavior of individuals who do 
not ascribe to any environmental responsibility: not only are they less likely to 
adopt income-neutral or income-negative behaviors but they will also be less likely 
to consider PEB even if they imply economic savings/gains. 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
This paper supports an integrated framework of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
for PEB. Our empirical model, based on survey data of 28,000 individuals across the 
European Union’s 28 current member states, assessed the relative strength of 
intrinsic motivation and green infrastructures and the effect of their interaction on 
eight self-reported PEBs. It further took a holistic approach by extending the 
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analysis to non-strictly-related factors, such as an individual’s economic condition 
and attitudes towards the future.  
 
Both intrinsic motivation and external conditions contribute positively to the 
likelihood that an individual will behave PE. However, between the two, intrinsic 
motivation—as measured by an individual’s norm recognition, ascription of 
responsibility and awareness of consequences proxies—dominates external 
conditions. This finding was consistent across the eight PEBs examined. 
 
In particular, ascription of responsibility appears to be an essential precondition for 
an individual to respond positively to external incentives, for example being less 
prone to negative influences (such as economic constraints) and more receptive to 
enabling conditions (such as the availability of economic rewards). Guagnano et al. 
(1995) proposed that intrinsic motivation can predict behavior outside of extreme 
external conditions (positive or negative); symmetrically, this paper analyzed the 
limits of external incentives and suggested that they can only be effective in 
promoting PEB among individuals who have a minimum level of intrinsic 
motivation.  
 
This identifies a problematic case of “Catch22”: just as someone cannot search for 
her lost glasses since she would need her glasses to find them, non-intrinsically 
motivated individuals should be dragged towards PEB by external incentives. 
However, such external incentives will be effective only for individuals who are 
already intrinsically motivated.  
 
The considerations above led us to conclude that a policy mix combining both 
intrinsic and extrinsic incentives is needed to secure a high observance rate of PEBs 
in the population. Raising intrinsic motivation through education and the perception 
that observance of the norm is dominant should in the long term decrease the 
number of non-intrinsically motivated individuals (i.e. defectors). Meanwhile, in the 
short term, improving the external conditions is likely to facilitate norm observance 
among those who are already motivated above a minimum threshold. This is 
consistent with Thøgersen and Ölander (2002), who suggested that intrinsic values 
(and the associated behaviors) can only change in the long term; consequently, the 
ideal short- and medium-term approach should combine educational efforts with 
policies aimed at facilitating PEBmaterially. 
 
In addition to these general findings, there are differences in the external factors 
that are relevant to each behavior. For example, there are behaviors that are more 
influenced by status (people identifying themselves with a higher social status are 
less likely to reduce their water consumption) and others that are more dependent 
on the availability of infrastructures and built-in habits (older people or people who 
live in rural areas are for instance less likely to renounce the comfort of their 
cars).  In general, the drivers of each PEB will vary depending on the perceived 
cost—that is, whether it is an income-neutral behavior or whether compliance 
implies economic rewards or losses. The table below summarizes additional policy 
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messages specific to each behavior. 
 
Table 4. Additional policy recommendations specific to each PEB  
Behavior Type PEB Policy Recommendations 
Recycling Waste 
separation 
for recycling 
Attaching economic remuneration to the act of recycling (e.g. through 
Bottle Bill legislation) is an effective way of increasing adoption rates 
(+2%).  
The evidence collected in this paper does not support the possibility that 
attaching an economic payoff to PEBs crowds out moral motivation. On 
the contrary, responses are positive even though the monetary 
contribution is minimal.  
Financial problems affect recycling rates negatively even though recycling 
is a cost-neutral behavior (and potentially a cost-saving behavior where 
pay-as-you-throw systems with free recycling and composting collection 
are in place). Presumably this happens because having economically 
pressing preoccupations can divert people’s attention from environmental 
concern and norms. The presence of a Bottle Bill helps in counteracting 
this effect. The extension of a deposit container law system to other 
materials or packaging types and the expansion of Bottle Bill legislation to 
more countries would benefit recycling rates.  
Household 
waste and 
resource use 
reduction 
Reduction of 
household 
waste 
The adoption of this behavior increases linearly with status level, possibly 
through income. Lower-status and financially distressed individuals are 
less likely to choose less-packaged products or products with a longer life.  
Presumably this is connected to the lower price of products that are not 
made to last and to the lower price of often over-packaged bulk purchases. 
This is consistent with Hausman (1979), according to whom lower-income 
groups discount more highly the potential future gains from buying more 
energy-efficient appliances.   
The provision of bonuses for lower-income groups for the purchase of 
products with a longer life (such as rechargeable batteries versus 
standard batteries) and the provision of economic incentives to firms and 
supermarket chains to limit the packaging of their products may provide 
effective solutions. The introduction of an environmental fee, which 
reflects the waste of resources in packaging and non-durable items, could 
also be effective in discouraging these kinds of purchases. However, the 
regressive impact of these measures on lower-income groups should be 
analyzed.  
Reduction of 
domestic 
water 
consumption 
The use of volumetric pricing schemes, and in some cases increasing block 
tariffs, appears to be conducive to water-saving behavior.  
However, price alone is not an effective way of reducing household water 
consumption for two reasons. Firstly, the relevance of the utility bill is 
relative to a person’s income level. For higher incomes even a volumetric 
pricing scheme may not be an effective deterrent from wasting water. 
Secondly, even a financially distressed individual is unlikely to cut down 
her water consumption as a way to ease her financial situation, unless she 
feels at least minimally responsible for the environment.  
Raising awareness about the consequences of water waste remains an 
essential precondition for the adoption of water-saving behavior. While 
price plays an important role in controlling water use, it may be ineffective 
if not linked to a user’s income. A progressive pricing scheme that 
increases with income could be one of the available options to influence 
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behavior on all income levels and take social equity into account. 
Reduction of 
domestic 
energy 
consumption 
The most commonly adopted energy-pricing schemes in Europe may have 
a regressive effect on the amounts consumed: the presence of an 
important fixed component means decreasing marginal prices for the 
consumer, which encourage use rather than deterring it.  
Further, the use of market prices for the marginal component implies that 
the user is more likely to try to reduce the final bill by using electricity at 
off-peak times rather than by diminishing its use.  
The use of a volumetric pricing scheme (and eventually increasing block 
tariffs) would instead promote price as a mechanism to induce energy-
saving behavior. The effect and effectiveness on different income levels 
should, however, be taken into account. 
Purchasing 
behaviors 
Purchase of 
green-label 
products 
The common perception, and often the reality, that green-label products 
are more expensive dominates the adoption of this behavior.  
Green purchases increase with social status and are lower among people 
with financial difficulties. Efforts to expand the offer of green products 
that are equally priced or cheaper than standard products could increase 
the adoption of this behavior, as a consumer survey revealed 
(RetailMeNot Inc, 2015). Additionally, providing lower-income groups 
with bonuses to purchase green-label products would be effective. 
Frequent internet users are also more likely to purchase green products. 
The diffusion of information on the differential environmental impact of 
green versus standard products in traditional communication channels 
(radio, television, paper press) could increase the adoption rate by 
reaching out to a different audience. 
Purchase of 
local 
products 
Individuals living in rural areas are more likely to purchase local products 
(+10% ceteris paribus). This might be connected to the proximity of rural 
areas to the agricultural produce. Increasing the connection between cities 
and the surrounding countryside’s produce may also encourage non-rural 
residents to purchase locally sourced products.  
Travel choices Choice of a 
greener way 
to travel 
Individuals who live in rural areas are considerably less likely to shift to 
green means of transport, such as bicycles, walking and public transport. 
This could be connected to the unavailability of alternatives and to the 
large distances in rural areas.   
Age is also negatively associated with choosing greener ways of traveling; 
this might be due to path-dependent behavior. 
While parents are more likely to adopt most PEBs, this does not hold for 
greener traveling, which may be due to the sometimes-intricate logistic 
necessities of families. 
The above would suggest offering public transport services tailored to 
families; actively promoting and organizing car-pooling systems in rural 
areas; and offering incentives for greener work commutes to help contain 
private traffic pollution. 
In general, individuals with economic difficulties are more likely to 
consider greener means of transport. However, this does not hold for all 
countries. In certain countries greener means of transport may not be 
viable or economically more convenient. In such cases ways to 
redistribute the economic gains from taking public transport to the end-
user should be investigated. 
Diminished Similar to the above, individuals who live in rural areas are less likely to 
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car use diminish their car use. While women are more likely to adopt the other 
seven PEBs observed (up to 32% more, ceteris paribus), they are less 
likely to diminish their car use. The reasons should be investigated 
further, as they might be tied to child-rearing needs or even to gender-
based safety concerns. 
  
Whether an environmental norm will activate into behavior or not depends not just 
on individual motivation or enabling external conditions but also on the salience 
that the norm has for the individual in the choice context. The empirical evidence 
gathered in this paper suggests that financial problems can distract the individual 
from acting PE, even when compliance with the norm is free of costs. In this case 
reframing the choice context into economic terms—by attaching an economic value 
to the behavior—can be successful in repairing this “loss of focus.”  
 
A distinction should be made between external conditions that are purely aimed at 
facilitating a behavior (such as conveniently located recycling bins) and others that 
instead more actively incentivize it through rewards or avoided fees (such as 
BottleBill legislation or pay-per-bag schemes). While it is uncontroversial that green 
infrastructures aimed at facilitating behavior positively affect PEB, the role of 
incentives is highly debated in the literature.  
 
Although a thorough test of the often-cited motivation crowding-out effect13 is 
beyond the scope of this paper, it can be noted that providing an economic incentive 
to recycle (e.g. as implied by a Bottle Bill legislation) does not decrease recycling 
rates but rather increases them. Additionally, the economic incentive is effective 
only in individuals with a medium to high level of personal commitment (e.g. 
ascription to responsibility) to act PE, supposedly because the economic payoff is 
generally too small even to be noticed by people who do not minimally commit to 
the environment. Thus, the evidence collected in this paper suggests that monetary 
incentives do not crowd out moral motivation but interact positively with it. This is 
in line with Ferrara and Missios (2012), who found that unit pricing of waste does 
not crowd out the moral motivation to recycle but it rather reinforces it.14  
                                                        
13 The motivation crowding-out theory proposes that the provision of external incentives, such as a 
monetary payoff, can undermine intrinsic motivation. See Frey (2012, 2008) and Frey and Jergen 
(2001) for an introduction to the concept.  
14 The crowding-out literature suggests that external incentives deliver information to the individual 
concerning the attractiveness of the task rewarded and the value of the action incentivized (Bénabou 
& Tirole, 2003). It also proposes that monetarily rewarding a task may change the narrative of the 
action, distracting the individual from the moral dimension of the action and gearing it towards an 
evaluation of whether the economic payoff is worth the effort (Cecere et al., 2014). In the case of the 
Bottle Bill, the monetary compensation received may not be perceived as a reward but rather as a 
refund on the additional value of the bottle paid; therefore, the symbolic price associated with each 
returned vessel may not necessarily be perceived as depreciating the effort involved. Further, under 
Bottle Bill schemes the user is often given the choice either to keep the credit for herself or to donate 
its value to a charitable organization, thereby reinforcing the moral dimension associated with the 
behavior. This choice structure cleverly attracts both types of individuals: it appeals to those who 
would not otherwise recycle but are economically sensitive to the small sums involved, but it also 
preserves the moral narrative for those who recycle as a pro-social act. 
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Since the benefits of PEB mostly materialize in the future, it was expected that 
individuals would be more likely to behave PE if they had an interest in the future—
such as the well-being of their offspring—if they were optimistic about it and if they 
had a future-oriented mindset—as proxied by their native language’s grammatical 
structure. All three indicators were relevant in explaining PEBand supported the 
hypothesis above, with the partial exception of pessimism for the future, which had 
a positive or negative impact depending on the behavior considered. These results 
suggest that individuals who act PE understand the intertemporal dimension of PEB, 
meaning that they can frame it correctly as future-oriented behavior, and that they 
will engage more in it the more valuable future outcomes are to them. Meanwhile, 
individuals who do not act PE may either place a lower value on the future or be less 
conscious of the impact that their behavior has on future environmental quality. The 
latter case would support the use of framing techniques to make the environmental 
consequences of day-to-day acts more obvious. 
 
The limitations in this study were linked to data availability. The main difficulty was 
represented by the unavailability of individual-level data in the same survey 
database on reported PEB, environmental attitudes and intertemporal preferences, 
which ultimately led to the selection of three relatively unusual indicators of 
attitudes towards the future. In addition, data regarding the availability of green 
infrastructures in the respondent’s area were not included in the Eurobarometer 
database, and, given that there is often high variance within locations in the same 
country, we had to rely on proxies. Data collected through an ad hoc survey would 
offer a chance to corroborate the findings presented in this paper regarding the 
relevance of external factors and the impact of future orientedness on PEB. 
 
The findings in this paper validate the importance of an integrated research and 
policy approach to PEB, which includes both external incentives and intrinsic 
motivation, not as competing paradigms but as interrelated factors.  
 
PEBs include a wide array of actions with different cost, lifestyle and status 
implications. While a few findings could be generalized across behaviors, clear 
differences also emerged. This suggests that policies should also approach each PEB 
individually in consideration of its specific features and the way in which it affects 
individuals’ perceptions and lives.  
 
This paper supports the idea that the impact of economic difficulties extends beyond 
affecting the economic ability or relative convenience of behaving PE. It also 
determines a shift of focus from the environmental norm towards more urgent 
short-term matters, to the point at which even cost-neutral PEBs are negatively 
affected. To date, no comprehensive research has been undertaken on the impact of 
economic problems on PEB. Especially in the context of the recent economic crisis, 
an overview of how PEBs’ observance rates have evolved since the beginning of the 
last economic crisis and a study on the conditions and extent to which individuals 
 26
trade environmental and economic priorities would give a more holistic 
understanding of the determinants of PEB. 
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Annex 1 – List of Eurobarometer’s attitudinal survey questions included  
 
Survey question: QA2. From the following list, please pick the five main 
environmental issues that you are worried about.  
Answer options (max. 5 answers, 16 and 17 are exclusive): 
1. The depletion of natural resources  
2. Our consumption habits  
3. The growing amount of waste  
4. Loss or extinction of species and their habitats and of natural ecosystems 
(forests, fertile soils)  
5. Shortage of drinking water  
6. Water pollution (seas, rivers, lakes and underground sources)  
7. Agricultural pollution (use of pesticides, fertilizers, etc.)  
8. Soil degradation  
9. Land take (i.e. that more land is used to build roads or cities and that cities 
expand into the surrounding countryside) 
10. The impact on our health of chemicals used in everyday products  
11. Air pollution  
12. Noise pollution  
13. Urban problems (traffic jams, pollution, lack of green spaces, etc.)  
14. The spread of harmful non-native plants and animals (invasive species)  
15. Other   
16. None   
17. Don’t know 
Use in the analysis: used to create explanatory variable EnvWorry. 
 
Survey question: QA11. Have you done any of the following for environmental 
reasons in the past month? 
Answer options (multiple answers possible, 10 and 11 are exclusive): 
1. Chosen a more environmentally friendly way of traveling (by foot, bicycle, 
public transport) 
2. Reduced waste, for example by avoiding over-packaged products and buying 
products with a longer life  
3. Separated most of your waste for recycling  
4. Cut down your water consumption  
5. Cut down your energy consumption, for example by turning down air 
conditioning or heating, not leaving appliances on stand-by, buying energy 
efficient appliances 
6. Bought environmentally friendly products marked with an environmental label 
7. Chosen local products  
8. Used your car less  
9. Other  
10. None  
11. Don’t know 
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Use in the analysis: used to create response variable PEB. 
 
Survey question: QA12. In your opinion, which of these should be the top-three 
priorities for people in (OUR COUNTRY) in their daily life to protect the 
environment?  
Answer options (max. 3 answers, 12 and 13 are exclusive): 
1. Use public transport as much as possible instead of using your own car 
2. Replace your car with a more energy-efficient one, even if it is smaller or more 
expensive  
3. Purchase environmentally friendly products for your daily needs  
4. Reduce food waste through smarter purchasing, storage, preparation and use 
of leftovers  
5. Sort waste so that it can be recycled  
6. Reduce waste, for example by avoiding over-packaged products and buying 
products with a longer life 
7. Reduce your home energy consumption (lighting, heating, household 
appliances) 
8. Consider environmental aspects when you make large purchases (e.g. 
travelling, heating systems, build a house, etc.)  
9. Buy more local products and avoid products that come from far away 
10. Reduce water consumption at home  
11. Other  
12. None 
13. Don’t know 
 
Use in the analysis: used to create explanatory variable Norm. 
 
Survey question: QA13.1 Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with 
each of the following statements: as an individual, you can play a role in 
protecting the environment in (OUR COUNTRY)   
Answer options (one answer): 
1. Totally agree 
2. Tend to agree 
3. Tend to disagree 
4. Totally disagree 
5. Don’t know 
 
Use in the analysis: used to create explanatory variable HighResp (=1), MedResp(=2,3), 
NoResp (=4). 
 
 
Survey question: QA16.3 In your opinion, is each of the following currently doing 
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too much, doing about the right amount or not doing enough to protect the 
environment? Your city, town or village  
Answer options (one answer): 
1. Doing too much 
2. Doing about the right amount 
3. Not doing enough 
4. Don’t know 
 
Use in the analysis: used to create explanatory variable EcoInfra. 
 
 
 
  
 34
Annex 2 – Matrix of environmental norms and worries linked to each PEB 
 
The table below summarizes the environmental norms and worries that we 
considered for each PEB in the econometric analysis. Individual values were 
obtained from the answers to survey questions QA11, QA12 and QA2.  
 
Table 5. Matrix of environmental norms and worries linked to each PEB  
Equation 
no. in 
Tables 1 
and 2 
PEB (question 
QA11) 
Norm (question QA12) EnvWorry (question QA2) 
1 Sum of the 8 PEBs  
At least one of the norms 
listed below. 
Sum of all worries, scale 0–5. 
2 
Waste separation for 
recycling 
Sort waste so that it can be 
recycled  
The growing amount of 
waste 
3 
Reduce household 
waste 
Reduce waste, for example 
by avoiding over-packaged 
products and buying 
products with a longer life 
The growing amount of 
waste 
4 
Reduce water 
consumption 
(domestic) 
Reduce water consumption 
at home  
Shortage of drinking water 
5 
Reduce energy 
consumption 
(domestic) 
Depletion of natural 
resources  
 
Reduce your home energy 
consumption (lighting, 
heating, household 
appliances) 
6 
Buy green-label 
products 
Purchase environmentally 
friendly products for your 
daily needs 
The impact on our health of 
chemicals used in everyday 
products 
7 Buy local products 
Buy more local products 
and avoid products that 
come from far away 
 
Land take (i.e. more land is 
used to build roads or cities 
and cities expand into the 
surrounding countryside) 
8 
Choose green 
traveling 
Use public transport as 
much as possible instead of 
using your own car 
Depletion of natural 
resources  
 
9 Use car less 
Use public transport as 
much as possible instead of 
using your own car  
Land take (i.e. more land is 
used to build roads or cities 
and cities expand into the 
surrounding countryside) 
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